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THE DILUTION OF THE CLEAN
WATER ACT
Mark C. Van Putten* and Bradley D. Jackson**
The bold objective of the federal Clean Water Act1 is to "re-
store and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integ-
rity of the Nation's waters."' 2 To achieve this objective, Con-
gress, in 1972, mandated steady progress toward restricting and
ultimately banning altogether pollutant discharges into the na-
tion's waters.
First and foremost, Congress declared as "the national goal
that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be
eliminated by 1985. ''s To achieve this "zero discharge" goal," the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had to
implement successively stricter technology-based, end-of-the-
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Great Lakes Natural Resources Center, Ann Arbor, Michigan; Assistant Clinical Profes-
sor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A., 1976, Calvin College; J.D., 1982, University of
Michigan.
** Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Land and Natural Resources Division, Gen-
eral Litigation Section. B.A., 1983, Kalamazoo College; J.D., 1986, University of Michi-
gan. The views expressed in this Article are Mr. Jackson's and are not necessarily those
of the Department of Justice.
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1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). Until 1977, the federal water pollution statute was
called the "Federal Water Pollution Control Act" (FWPCA). The 1977 amendments to
the Act provided an alternative title. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 2,
91 Stat. 1566 (The statute "may be cited as the 'Federal Water Pollution Control Act'
(commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act).") [hereinafter cited as the 1977 Amend-
ments]. In this Article we refer to the statute as the "Clean Water Act" or the "Act"
unless it is necessary to distinguish between the 1972 and 1977 versions of the Act.
For a history of federal water pollution control legislation, see infra notes 17-42 and
accompanying text. See also EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control
Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202-09 (1976) (dictum); Montgomery Envtl. Coalition v. Costle, 646
F.2d 568, 573-74 (D.C. Cir. 1980); F. GRAD. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.03[2] (3d ed. 1985);
R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY 501-36 (1978 & Supp. 1982);
D. ZwIcK & M. BENSTOCK, WATER WASTELAND (1971); Zener, The Federal Law of Water
Pollution Control, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 682 (1974).
2. Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982).
3. Id. § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
4. See ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Div., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CON-
GRESS, 93D CONG., 1ST SEss., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 189 (Comm. Print 1973) (Senate consideration of the con-
ference committee report) (statement of Sen. Cooper that this is a "goal of no pollution")
[hereinafter cited as 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
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pipe effluent limitations. 5 Feasibility and costs of control rather
than the environmental effects of pollutant discharges were the
only relevant considerations in setting these limitations.'
In addition, Congress adopted an interim goal of "fishable-
swimmable" waters by 1983 to serve as a benchmark for measur-
ing progress toward the 1985 zero discharge goal.7 Achievement
of the interim goal was to prevent water quality from falling be-
low minimally acceptable levels while EPA implemented the
successively stricter technology-based effluent limitations.8 The
interim goal was to be implemented through the development of
ambient water quality standards based on the health and envi-
ronmental effects of particular water pollutants.9
Despite the Clean Water Act's ambitious goals, implementa-
tion has lagged behind the statutory deadlines. The regulatory
experience under the Act has taught that eliminating pollutant
discharges into national waters will be far more difficult than the
Ninety-Second Congress thought. As attainment of the zero dis-
charge goal becomes more elusive, the continuing integrity of the
Act's underlying premise is increasingly open to criticism.10
5. See Clean Water Act § 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1982).
6. EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202
(1976) (dictum); Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 7
(1976); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377 (D.C. Cir.
1977). See Clean Water Act § 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1982) (requiring implementa-
tion by most dischargers of federal effluent standards reflecting "best practical control
technology currently available" (BPT) by July 1, 1977 and, under the 1972 Act, "best
available technology economically achievable" (BAT) by July 1, 1983).
The 1977 Amendments postponed implementation of BAT standards for most pollu-
tants to July 1, 1984 and added a new standard of "best conventional pollutant control
technology" (BCT) for a new category of "conventional pollutants." Id. § 301(b)(2)(A),
(E), (F), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A), (E), (F).
7. Clean Water Act § 101(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1982); see S. REP. No. 414,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1972 SENATE REPORT], reprinted in
1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1415, 1427.
8. Clean Water Act § 302, 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (1982). More stringent pollution controls
derived from health-based ambient water quality standards are required where EPA
finds that technology-based effluent limits "would interfere with attaining the [1983] in-
terim goal." S. CONF. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
1972 CONFERENCE REPORT], reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 281,
304; see also EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200,
205 n.12 (1976) (dictum); American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir.
1976); H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 105 (1972) ("Water quality standards will
be utilized for the purpose of setting effluent limitations in those cases where effluent
limitations for point sources would not be consistent with such standards.") [hereinafter
cited as 1972 HousE REPORT], reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at
753, 792; 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 46, reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 4, at 1464; F. GRAD, supra note 1, at 80-81.
9. Clean Water Act § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1982).
10. See, e.g., Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972: A Proposal for Congressional Action, 67 IowA L. REv. 1057
(1982).
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Many policymakers of the pragmatic 1980's have only amused
disdain for the naivete of their counterparts of the early 1970's."
The contemporary debate over whether some of the nation's wa-
ters are now too clean illustrates the extent to which some
would effectively read the zero discharge goal out of the Act.
This Article argues that the zero discharge goal of the Clean
Water Act is more than naive rhetoric. To the contrary, it is the
Act's raison d'etre, and it is woven into the fabric of the Act's
operative provisions. So understood, the zero discharge goal can
and should provide continuing guidance for EPA's implementa-
tion of the Act.
To illustrate the continuing importance of the zero discharge
goal, the Article examines the evolution of two EPA policies.
The first is the "antibacksliding" rule,' which prohibits-except
in certain specific circumstances-relaxation of effluent limita-
tions contained in discharge permits issued to polluters un-
der the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES).' The second is the "antidegradation" rule, which is
11.
As to whether [the zero discharge] goal should be a binding one, I think the
answer is no, because what you have is the problem of us being able to measure
more and more carefully every year to find out that things are present in such
trace quantities that if you take zero in some kind of an absolute and scientific
sense we will never get to zero on any kind of discharge. If we said we won't have
any kinds of discharges into water bodies at all and we will dispose of all this
material, you end up with the paradox of having to dispose on the land or into
the air. There is no way to do this in our life. We are stuck with all the wastes
we generate. Some of them we can use. However, many of them are not reusable
or recyclable and they end up becoming part of our discharges that go into our
air, into our streams and oceans.
To limit those is certainly a goal. To control these discharges so that we have
fishable/swimmable streams is a goal that we would support. But zero discharge
is not scientifically attainable in an absolute sense.
I think what we have said is that if you take the no discharge goal in that kind
of general way of what was America trying to accomplish, and that is to remove
those pollutants that have an impact on stream life, we are going to do that. If
you take it in a more literal sense, then in that narrowest definition of remov-
ing all materials out of water, it is an indefensible argument and one we can't
support.
Clean Water Act Amendments of 1982: Hearings on S. 777 and S. 2652 Before the Sub-
comm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public
Works, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1982) (testimony of John Hernandez, Deputy Adminis-
trator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as
1982 Senate Hearings].
12. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.44, 122.62 (1986); see 49 Fed. Reg. 38,018-22 (1983).
13. Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982); see infra notes 45-80 and accom-
panying text.
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intended to protect "high quality" waters from becoming de-
graded by new or increased pollutant discharges."
The efficacy of these policies depends upon the continued vi-
tality of the zero discharge goal. The hesitancy with which EPA
has implemented these policies reflects the Agency's equivoca-
tion on the integrity of the zero discharge goal.15 As a result,
implementation of the antibacksliding and antidegradation poli-
cies, and of the Act itself, is mired in the same morass from
which Congress sought in 1972 to rescue federal water pollution
control efforts-an arcane, unending debate over how much
water pollution is too much.
Part I of this Article explains what Congress did, or intended
to do, to solve the complex problem of water pollution in enact-
ing the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) Amend-
ments of 1972.16 In short, Congress intended to prohibit eventu-
ally all discharges of pollutants regardless of the environmental
benefits associated with each successively stricter increment of
control. The Clean Water Act allows pollutant discharges only to
the extent immediate prohibition is not economically and tech-
nologically feasible.
Part II describes the implications of the zero discharge goal
for two continuing controversies over the Act's implementation:
first, whether (and if so, under what conditions) effluent limita-
tions contained in NPDES permits may be relaxed, or allowed
to "backslide"; and second, whether (and if so, under what con-
ditions) the Act allows the degradation of existing ambient
water quality by new or increased pollutant discharges. Specific
factual situations drawn from the experience of one of the au-
thors provide a context for examining these issues, which are in-
creasingly raised by dischargers seeking relaxation of their
NPDES permit limitations.
I. WHAT CONGRESS DID (OR INTENDED TO Do)
The 1972 FWPCA Amendments were one in a series of media-
specific federal statutes that established primary federal author-
ity over environmental protection. 7 In the early 1970's, Con-
14. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (1986).
15. See supra note 11.
16. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816. For an explanation of how the Clean Water Act
is referred to in this Article, see supra note 1.
17. For a general overview of the 1972 Amendments, see Smith, Highlights of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 77 DICK. L. REV. 459 (1973); Note, The
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gress inaugurated an environmental policy defining more pre-
cisely the "rights to, and responsibility for, use of the air, water,
and land resources."1 8 More specifically, the 1972 FWPCA
Amendments grew out of Congress's frustration with over
twenty-five years of ineffective federal and state water pollution
control efforts. The Senate Public Works Committee succinctly
concluded that, as of 1972, "the national effort to abate and con-
trol water pollution has been inadequate in every vital aspect."" e
With the 1972 Amendments, Congress departed radically from
past federal approaches to water pollution control. Congress
abandoned the underlying premise of all previous federal water
pollution control policies-that water pollution control should
be based on calculating "acceptable" pollution levels for a par-
ticular water body and then allocating this "assimilative capac-
ity" between pollutant sources. Adoption of the zero discharge
goal thus "marked an entire change in regulatory philosophy." 0
The premise of the Clean Water Act is that any discharge of
pollutants into national waters is unacceptable and should cease
as soon as control is technologically and economically feasible.
This Part sets out Congress's reasons for adopting the zero dis-
charge goal and describes the regulatory scheme Congress
adopted to reach that goal by 1985.
A. The Zero Discharge Goal
Before 1972, the federal approach to water pollution control
accepted some level of water pollution as a necessary evil of
modern life. Diluting wastes by discharging them into the na-
tion's waters was viewed as an acceptable method of disposal,
at least up to some point of unacceptable water quality
degradation.
The Water Quality Act of 1965 (WQA)2' marked the first as-
sertion of primary federal authority in national water pollution
control efforts.2 2 The WQA required each state to develop and
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 893.
18. 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 3, reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISToRY,
supra note 4, at 1421.
19. Id. at 7, reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1425; see also
1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 494 (House debate on H.R. 11896) (state-
ment of Rep. Vanik that the existing water pollution scheme was "administratively un-
workable and philosophically faulty").
20. F. GRAD, supra note 1, at 72.
21. Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903.
22. In establishing a "national policy" for water pollution control, the WQA repre-
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enforce ambient water quality standards for interstate waters.2 s
These standards were to specify for particular pollutants ambi-
ent concentrations that would not adversely affect "the use and
value" of interstate waters "for public water supplies, propaga-
tion of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural,
industrial, and other legitimate uses. '2 4 Thus, pollutant dis-
charges were allowed so long as they did not cause a violation of
ambient standards.
The WQA preserved the enforcement procedures of the Water
Pollution Control Act of 1948.25 Upon violation of an ambient
standard, EPA commenced an extended informal enforcement
"conference" in which state and federal water pollution control
agencies negotiated for discharge reductions with the dischargers
causing the violation. 6
In 1972, Congress abandoned water quality standards as the
primary means of controlling water pollution. Dilution in the na-
tion's waters was rejected as an acceptable means of waste dis-
posal. In declaring that "[t]he use of any river, lake, stream or
ocean as a waste treatment system is unacceptable, 2 7 Congress
made a basic legislative finding that any pollutant discharge into
national waters was simply too much. The 1972 Amendments
sented the first time that the federal government took the lead from the states in any
antipollution effort. F. GRAD, supra note 1, at 70. Before 1965, federal legislation was
limited to establishing cooperative federal-state efforts, with the states given the lead
and the federal government's role limited to assisting the states in developing and attain-
ing water quality standards. 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 1, reprinted in 1972
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1419; see Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L.
No. 80-845, § 1, 62 Stat. 1155, 1155 (1948):
[Tihe policy of Congress [is] to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary re-
sponsibilities and rights of the States in controlling water pollution, to support
and aid technical research to devise and perfect methods of treatment of indus-
trial wastes which are not susceptible to known effective methods of treatment,
and to provide Federal technical services to State and interstate agencies and to
industries, and financial aid to State and interstate agencies and to municipali-
ties, in the formulation and execution of their stream pollution abatement
programs.
Although amended often between 1948 and 1965, the Act's fundamental policy objec-
tives remained the same until passage of the WQA. For a breakdown of the major provi-
sions of the pre-1965 Acts, see 1972 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 66-68, reprinted in
1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 753-55.
23. Water Quality Act § 10(c), 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c) (Supp. I 1965).
24. Id. § 10(c)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c)(3).
25. Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155; see supra note 22; 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra
note 7, at 2, reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1420.
26. Water Quality Act § 10(d)-(f), 33 U.S.C. § 466g(d)-(f) (Supp. I 1965); 1972 SENATE
REPORT, supra note 7, at 2, reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at
1420.
27. 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 7, reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 4, at 1425.
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expressly negate any claim of right to pollute the nation's wa-
ters. To the extent that discharge reductions are technologically
and economically feasible, pollutant discharges are unlawful.2"
Congress therefore declared the goal of "zero discharge" by 1985
and directed EPA to develop nationally uniform, end-of-the-
pipe effluent limitations based upon the costs and feasibility of
control.
Congress gave several reasons for abandoning the water qual-
ity-based approach to controlling water pollution. These in-
cluded the scientific uncertainties involved in the development
of ambient water quality standards, the administrative burdens
and delay caused by such uncertainties, the disparity of water
quality standards among the states, and the difficulties in the
enforcement of ambient standards.
1. Scientific uncertainties- Adoption of the zero discharge
goal avoided the substantial scientific uncertainties encountered
in the development of water quality standards. These standards
require two kinds of often elusive data. First, the regulator must
ascertain the effects of particular pollutants on aquatic biota
and on the uses of a particular water body. Water pollution
causes a range of adverse environmental conditions, both acute
and chronic, that often are difficult to observe in the short-term.
To further complicate matters, the standard-setter must con-
sider hydrological conditions specific to the water body that
ameliorate or exacerbate a pollutant's impact."' Second, in order
to translate data on pollution effects into effluent limitations,
the regulator must determine the impacts on water quality at-
tributable to particular dischargers."0 These data are expensive
to obtain and often difficult to interpret. Moreover, even where
28. The Act "clearly establishes that the discharge of pollutants is unlawful. Unlike
its predecessor program which permitted the discharge of certain amounts of pollutants
. . . .this legislation [clearly establishes] that no one has the right to pollute-that
pollution continues because of technological limits, not because of any inherent right to
use the nation's waterways for the purpose of disposing of wastes." 1972 SENATE REPORT,
supra note 7, at 42, reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1460 (em-
phasis added); see Clean Water Act § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1982).
29. See generally OFFICE OF WATER REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS, U.S. ENVTL. PRO-
TECTION AGENCY, WATER QUALrY STANDARDS HANDBOOK 1-2 to 1-9 (1983).
30. See, e.g., OFFICE OF WATER REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, GUIDANCE FOR STATE WATER MONITORING AND WASTELOAD ALLOCATION PRO-
GRAMS 7, 9 (1985); OFFICE OF WATER ENFORCEMENT AND PERMITS & OFFICE OF WATER
REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, TECHNICAL SUPPORT Doc-
UMENT FOR WATER QUALITY-BASED Toxics CONTROL (1985); OFFICE OF WATER REGULA-
TIONS AND STANDARDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, TECHNICAL GUIDANCE MANUAL
FOR PERFORMING WASTE LOAD ALLOCATIONS (1984) (Book II Streams and Rivers, Chapter
3 Toxic Substances).
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adequate data as to the effects of a particular pollutant exist,
the water quality-based approach requires difficult judgments as
to which effects justify discharge limitations.3 1
Congress recognized these inherent deficiencies of the water
quality-based approach and substituted a system of water pollu-
tion controls that did not rely for their validity upon demonstra-
ble environmental harm.3 2 Above all, Congress intended to es-
tablish means by which EPA and the states could develop
readily enforceable pollutant discharge limitations.3 3
2. Administrative burdens and delay- The inherent scien-
tific uncertainties of the water quality standard-setting process
delayed the development of necessary pollutant discharge con-
31. Senator Cooper best summarized the complexity of the water quality standard-
setting process:
Until now and under the 1965 act . . . [tlhe States have been called upon to
classify their streams and waters for agriculture use, industrial use, municipal
water supply, fish and wildlife, and recreation uses. Then, usually with the con-
sideration of the "assimilative capacity of the receiving waters" and with the
determination of an appropriate "mixing zone," an attempt was to be made to
assign the remaining pollution or diluted pollution to sources which were consid-
ered to be responsible for that pollution. This was and is an inherently difficult
procedure, and under the 1965 act has been a discouragingly slow process.
1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1304 (Senate debate on S. 2770).
32.
We have seen a great deal of evidence indicating that this water quality stan-
dards system of regulation assumes more knowledge about our complex ecosys-
tem than we actually have. The numerical criteria themselves are often largely
arbitrary and serve mainly to fool the public into thinking everything is "safe."
Also, the history of our water pollution control program suggests that State and
Federal governments will continue to founder on the staggering complexity of
this control system, which requires working mathematically back from the per-
mitted pollution levels in a waterway to the effluent limitations at the point
source needed to achieve them.
1972 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 396, reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 4, at 865 (additional views of Reps. Abzug and Rangel).
33. Congress abandoned the water quality-based approach in favor of technology-
based effluent limitations
because of the great difficulty associated with establishing reliable and enforce-
able precise effluent limitations on the basis of a given stream quality. Water
quality standards, in addition to their deficiencies in relying on the assimilative
capacity of receiving waters, often cannot be translated into effluent limita-
tions-defendable in court tests, because of the imprecision of models for water
quality and the effects of effluents in most waters.
Under this Act the basis of pollution prevention and elimination will be the
application of effluent limitations. Water quality will be a measure of program
effectiveness and performance, not a means of elimination and enforcement.
The Committee recommends the change to effluent limits as the best available
mechanism to control water pollution. With effluent limits, the Administrator
can require the best control technology; he need not search for a precise link
between pollution and water quality.
1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 8, reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 4, at 1426.
Clean Water Act
trols. The burden of these uncertainties fell upon the pollution
control agencies. They were forced to commit substantial re-
sources to establish the requisite and complex relationship be-
tween water pollution and water quality before imposing con-
trols upon dischargers. Conversely, dischargers used such
uncertainties to challenge and delay the imposition of proposed
water quality-based effluent limitations. Not surprisingly, the
states were unable to develop in a timely manner the water
quality standards for interstate waters required by the 1948 and
1965 Acts., 4 Therefore, Congress saw abandoning primary reli-
ance on the water quality-based approach and adoption of the
zero discharge goal as "essential, for it allows the Administrator
[of EPA] to require the best control technology without having
to provide a direct relationship between water pollution and
water quality. 3 5
3. Disparity among the states- Because the water quality
standards required under the 1965 Act were site-specific and
largely within state authority, the water quality-based approach
provided incentives for states to use less restrictive pollution
control criteria to attract economic development by "pollution
shopping" industries. The prospect of industries playing states
off one another for the least restrictive limitations on pollutant
discharges was a significant threat to implementation of the fed-
eral program.30 Furthermore, the inherent scientific uncertain-
34.
The task of setting water quality standards, assigned to the States by the 1966
legislation, is lagging. More than 4 years after the deadline for submission of
standards, only a little more than half of the States have fully approved stan-
dards. Of the 54 jurisdictions covered by the water pollution control program...
only 27 have fully approved standards.
1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1256 (Senate debate on S. 2770) (statement
of Sen. Muskie); see also 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 8, reprinted in 1972
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1426.
35. 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 209 (Senate consideration of confer-
ence report) (statement of Sen. Tunney); see also 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at
8, reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1426.
36.
One of the most critical problems inherent in legislating water pollution con-
trols is that the standards will be so haphazard that workers will be pushed out
of jobs by industries moving from State to State in search of less strict pollution
standards.... We must establish national effluent limitations to prevent indus-
trial "shopping" and we must establish an equitable system of assistance to
those workers and communities affected by plant closures due to environmental
regulations.
1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 517 (House debate on H.R. 11896) (state-
ment of Rep. Harrington).
This sentiment was extended to the concept of nationally uniform standards as well.
National standards, according to some critics, constituted "environmental blackmail" for
SUMMER 1986]
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ties of the water quality standard-setting process provided state
regulators with the means to accommodate industry, as plausible
scientific justifications could be developed for virtually any
standards.37
Even if pollutant dischargers and states did not deliberately
take advantage of the economic implications of variable pollu-
tant control standards, disparity among states caused competi-
tive disadvantages. Congress therefore sought to avoid the ineq-
uities of competitive disadvantages between dischargers in
different states operating under diverse water pollution control
requirements. 3
4. Enforceability- The pre-1972 federal water pollution
control scheme proved to be unenforceable. The enforcement
record under the 1948 and 1965 Acts spoke for itself. In over two
decades only one case reached the courts, and in that case over
four years elapsed between the initial enforcement conference
and the dispositive consent decree. 9
The scientific uncertainties that delayed the water quality
standard-setting process also rendered enforcement of existing
standards difficult if not impossible. Because water quality stan-
dards are expressed in ambient concentrations, establishing that
a particular discharger caused a violation was nearly impossible.
Even where the scientific data needed to make such a showing
existed, the enforcement conference process was cumbersome
and ineffective.' °
Furthermore, enforcement was the primary responsibility of
the states except in a narrow category of situations.41 Thus, the
same pressures and incentives that operated against timely de-
velopment of uniform state water quality standards also mili-
which the "ransom was too high," and would cause industries to move to other countries
with lesser water pollution controls. Id. at 470 (statement of Rep. Dingell (quoting Min-
nesota Governor Wendell R. Anderson)). See infra note 130.
37. "[D]ue to the pressures of powerful economic interests, the States do not estab-
lish meaningful quality levels and create water 'zones'-some good, but mostly bad." Id.
at 494 (House debate on H.R. 11896) (statement of Rep. Vanik).
38. See 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 44, reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 4, at 1462.
39. 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1257 (Senate debate on S. 2770)
(statement of Sen. Muskie).
40. Id.
41. The 1965 Act permitted federal abatement actions only when (1) the water qual-
ity of interstate waters was reduced below established standards, (2) pollutant discharges
in one state endangered the health or welfare of the residents of another state, or (3) the
Governor of the state in which the discharges originated consented to the abatement
action. Water Quality Act § 10(c)(5), (d)(1), (g), 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c)(5), (d)(1), (g) (Supp.
I 1965); see also 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1256-57 (Senate debate on
S. 2770) (statement of Sen. Muskie).
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tated against stringent and uniform state enforcement of those
requirements.
For these reasons, Congress abandoned ambient water quality
standards as the primary mechanism for federal water pollution
control. Instead, Congress adopted the zero discharge goal and
mandated a comprehensive scheme of technology-based effluent
limitations imposed through the issuance of NPDES permits to
implement the goal.42
42. Congress confirmed the continued vitality of the zero discharge goal in 1977 in
making several "mid-course corrections" of the Clean Water Act. See generally Hall,
The Clean Water Act of 1977, 11 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 343 (1978); Note, The Clean
Water Act of 1977: Midcourse Corrections in the Section 404 Program, 57 NEB. L. REV.
1092 (1978). In 1972, Congress recognized that its radical reforms in federal water pollu-
tion control efforts could have unpredictable consequences. Therefore, it adopted § 315
of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982), which established a national study commission di-
rected to "make a full and complete investigation and study of all of the technological
aspects of achieving, and all aspects of the total economic, social, and environmental
effects of achieving or not achieving, the effluent limitations and goals" of the Act. See
1972 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 136, reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 4, at 319. This study would allow for informed "mid-course corrections" at
some later date. See, e.g., 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 175 (Senate con-
sideration of conference report) (statement of Sen. Muskie); id. at 1270 (Senate debate
on S. 2770) (statement of Sen. Randolph).
The National Commission on Water Quality transmitted its report and recommenda-
tions to Congress in March 1976. Although making several recommendations for legisla-
tive adjustments in the Act, the Commission "emphasize[d] that the recommendations
are not shifts in basic policy, nor an effort to reverse the thrust of the legislation. Rather,
they are in the nature of the changes to improve the means of reaching its important and
ambitious objectives." REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON WATER
QUALITY 4 (1976).
The Commission did, however, recommend a redefinition of the zero discharge goal in
light of clear evidence that technology capable of meeting the goal by 1985 would not be
"a practical option." Id. at 30. The Commission recommended that the zero discharge
goal be redefined to "stress conservation and reuse of resources," and that "accelerated
research" be undertaken toward the achievement of that goal. Id. at 29.
Congress implicitly rejected the Commission's recommendation by not amending the
zero discharge goal in 1977. Instead, the 1977 Amendments dealt primarily with stricter
regulation of toxic pollutants, Clean Water Act § 307, 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1982); some
extensions of the 1983 deadlines, id. § 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b); federal funding, id.
§§ 104(u), 106(a), 112(c), 208(0, 314(c), 517, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1254(u), 1256(a), 1262(c),
1288(0, 1324(c), 1376; state implementation, id. § 101(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g); and the
availability of information, id. § 304(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a). These changes, while nu-
merous, constituted relatively modest corrections. The 1977 Amendments therefore rep-
resented an implicit declaration "that the overall thrust and objectives of the program
should not be abandoned." S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977), reprinted in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Div., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
95TH CONG., 2D SESs., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977, A CON-
TINUATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
633, 636 (Comm. Print 1978).
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B. Incremental Progress Toward the Zero Discharge Goal:
Exceptions to the Pollutant Discharge Prohibition
The fundamental premise of the 1972 Act's complex regula-
tory provisions is the declaration that "the discharge of any pol-
lutant by any person shall be unlawful. 4 3 Dischargers in viola-
tion of this prohibition are subject to civil penalties of up to
$10,000 per day. EPA44 or any citizen 5 may bring an enforce-
ment action in federal court.
The prohibition has two important aspects. First, it prohibits
the discharge of pollutants-the addition of materials in any
quantity to the nation's waters-and not pollution-a demon-
strable effect on an aquatic environment. Second, it establishes
the presumption under the Clean Water Act that all pollutant
discharges are unlawful. In other words, under the Act, no one
has any legal right to use the nation's waters for waste disposal
purposes.
There are, of course, exceptions to the Act's basic prohibition,
and most of the Act's regulatory provisions deal with these ex-
ceptions. Most importantly, a pollutant discharge in compliance
with a permit issued under section 402(a) of the Act46 is deemed
to be in compliance with the section 301(a) prohibition for pur-
poses of EPA or citizen enforcement actions. 7
Section 402 governs the NPDES permit process. The Act au-
thorizes EPA to issue NPDES permits that exempt dischargers
from the blanket prohibition of section 301(a), provided the dis-
charge meets several other requirements of the Act.'" In particu-
43. Clean Water Act § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1982).
44. Id. § 309(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b).
45. Id. § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).
46. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1982).
47. Clean Water Act § 402(k), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (1982); see id. § 301(a), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a).
48. Section 402(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1982), provides, inter alia, that "the Admin-
istrator may, after opportunity for public hearing issue a permit for the discharge of any
pollutant, or combination of pollutants, notwithstanding section [301(a)], upon condition
that such discharge will meet ... all applicable requirements under sections [301, 302,
306, 307, 308, and 403]."
In E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977), the Supreme Court
held that applicable § 301(b) technology-based effluent limitations promulgated by EPA
must be included by permit writers in individual NPDES permits. Once these limitations
are written into a permit, they become legal obligations of the discharger.
The D.C. Circuit has construed the permissive phrasing of § 402(a) ("the Administra-
tor may...") as giving EPA the discretion to use NPDES permits to exempt dischargers
from the Act's presumptive prohibition. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle,
568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977). It is, however, the only means by which EPA can do so.
There is growing authority that an NPDES permit authorizes only those discharges spe-
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lar, NPDES permits must contain effluent limitations on the
amounts of specific pollutants-especially priority toxic
pollutants-discharged."'
Either EPA or states with EPA-approved NPDES permit pro-
grams issue NPDES permits.50 States wishing to administer the
NPDES program must satisfy the requirements of section
402(b) and the guidelines that EPA is required to promulgate
under section 304(i). 5' To date, thirty-six states and the Virgin
Islands administer EPA-approved NPDES permit programs.52
As to state-administered NPDES programs, EPA retains au-
thority to review proposed permits and to object to their issu-
ance if they are not consistent with the "guidelines and require-
ments" of the Act. 53 If EPA objects to the issuance of a permit,
cifically provided for in the permit and not, as some dischargers have argued, all dis-
charges except those limited in the permit. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. v. Hodel, 586
F. Supp. 1163, 1168-69 (E.D. Tenn. 1984); United States v. Amoco Oil Co., 580 F. Supp.
1042, 1051-52 (W.D. Mo. 1984); see also City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 318
(1981) ("Every point source discharge is prohibited unless covered by a permit, which
directly subjects the discharger to the administrative apparatus established by Congress
to achieve its goals.").
49. The major "mid-course correction" worked by the 1977 Amendments was
strengthening the controls on toxic pollutants. Clean Water Act § 307(a)(1), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1317(a)(1) (1982). Under the 1972 Act, the process for designating pollutants as
"toxic" and regulating them through § 307(a) was unwieldy and little used by EPA. By
1973, EPA had classified only nine substances as toxic pollutants and had not set stan-
dards for any of them. Frustrated with this lack of progress, the Natural Resources De-
fense Council and Citizens for a Better Environment sued EPA under the citizen suit
provisions of the Act to force issuance of toxic pollutant standards.
To settle this lawsuit, EPA agreed to list 65 toxic pollutants that it would regulate by
setting technology-based effluent limits for the 21 industries that discharged them. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council v. Train, 6 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,588 (D.D.C.
1976) (final order and decree by Judge Flannery); see also Hall, The Control of Toxic
Pollutants Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 63
IOWA L. REV. 609 (1978). In other words, EPA agreed to regulate these pollutants under §
301(b) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1982), instead of under § 307(a).
In the 1977 Amendments, Congress incorporated this list into § 307(a)(1) and required
EPA to establish technology-based effluent limits for dischargers of these substances.
Congress also set a compliance deadline of July 1, 1984 for meeting these limits. Despite
this shift in the means of regulating toxic pollutants, Congress retained § 307(a), but
eased the procedural prerequisites to its use. Nevertheless, EPA has not made much use
of this section to regulate toxic pollutants. See generally Gaba, Regulation of Toxic Pol-
lutants Under the Clean Water Act: NPDES Toxics Control Strategies, 50 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 761 (1985); Wyche, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water
Act: EPA's Ten Year Rulemaking Nears Completion, 15 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 511
(1983).
50. EPA has promulgated detailed regulations governing the issuance of NPDES per-
mits, whether by EPA or by an authorized state. 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 123 (1986).
51. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b), 1314(i) (1982); see 40 C.F.R. pt. 123 (1986); id. § 403.8.
52. See 50 Fed. Reg. 42,527 (1985).
53. Clean Water Act § 402(d)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2)(B) (1982); 40 C.F.R.
§ 123.23 (1986); see Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 567 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1977) (finding EPA
veto of state-issued NPDES permit invalid if not expressly based upon statutory provi-
sion or published regulation or guideline).
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it may not be issued,54 and EPA can instead issue a federal per-
mit with federally-approved limits to the discharger. 55 If a state
fails to administer its program in accordance with the require-
ments of the Act and the applicable regulations, EPA may re-
voke the state's authority to issue NPDES permits."
The 1972 Act directed EPA to promulgate technology-based
effluent limitation guidelines based on the availability and af-
fordability of treatment technologies.17 EPA must continually
review the state of pollution control technology, determine the
costs of various levels of control, and, based on these considera-
tions, set nationally-uniform effluent limitations applicable to
various categories of industrial dischargers. 8 Congress recog-
nized that this task would be very time consuming, so the Act
54. Clean Water Act § 402(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (1982).
55. Id. § 402(d)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(4). EPA may issue a federal permit to assure
that the minimum Clean Water Act requirements are met when a state is unwilling or
unable to impose these requirements on a particular discharger.
56. Id. § 402(c)(2)-(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(2)-(3). One court has suggested that EPA
may not revoke a state NPDES program based solely upon the handling of a single per-
mit, but that revocation requires a pattern of noncompliance with federal requirements.
Save the Bay, Inc. v. EPA, 556 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1977).
Only recently has EPA taken seriously its obligation to oversee state NPDES pro-
grams. See Office of Water Enforcement and Permits, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency,
NPDES State Program Guidance for Development and Review of State Program Sub-
mission and Evaluation of State Legal Authorities (Feb. 20, 1985) (draft); Memorandum
from Jack E. Ravan, Assistant Administrator for Water, EPA, to EPA Regional Admin-
istrators (July 6, 1984) ("Guidance for Oversight of NPDES Programs"); Memorandum
from William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator, EPA, to EPA Staff (Apr. 4, 1984) ("Agency
Policies on Delegation and Oversight: Making the State-EPA Partnership Work").
Wisconsin's NPDES permit program has come under increasing scrutiny by EPA for
inconsistencies with § 301(b)(1)(C) of the Act, which requires dischargers to achieve ef-
fluent limitations necessary to meet water quality standards irrespective of individual
cost-benefit considerations. Under Wisconsin law, the State is unable to incorporate such
effluent limitations until it has shown that there is a "reasonable relationship between
the economic and social costs and the benefits to be obtained." WIs. STAT. § 147.05(3)
(1983-1984). Contra 40 C.F.R. § 123.25 (1986) (requiring that states administering
NPDES program have authority to impose water quality permit limitations consistent
with § 301 of the Act and 40 C.F.R. § 122.44). EPA has notified Wisconsin that approval
of the State's NPDES permit program is "in jeopardy" due to "this major deficiency in
the State's program." Letter from Valdas V. Adamkus, Regional Administrator, EPA
Region 5, to C.D. Besadny, Secretary, Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (June
30, 1986).
57. Congress carefully prescribed the factors to be considered by EPA in setting
these guidelines in § 304(b) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1982).
58. Id. EPA's effluent limitation guidelines must be revised every five years to
reevaluate the ability to control further or eliminate pollutant discharges. Id. § 301(d),
33 U.S.C. § 1311(d). States must submit biennial reports to EPA on progress towards
eliminating pollutant discharges and "additional actions" necessary to achieve this objec-
tive. Id. § 304(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1). Nothing in the Act suggests that these site-
specific "additional actions" cannot include additional site-specific technology-based
controls.
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also authorizes EPA to develop site-specific, technology-based
permit limits in the interim .5
In promulgating these guidelines, EPA has divided American
industry into thirty-four categories.60 EPA analyzes the waste
streams of dischargers within these categories to identify the fre-
quency and concentration of pollutants present." Then, for each
59. Id. § 402(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a), provides:
[T]he Administrator may ... issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant,
or combination of pollutants .... upon condition that such discharge will meet
either all applicable requirements [of several sections of the Act, including the
effluent limitation guidelines provision] or prior to the taking of necessary imple-
menting actions relating to all such requirements, such conditions as the Ad-
ministrator determines are necessary to carry out the provisions of this
chapter.
(emphasis added).
These site-specific, technology-based limits are commonly referred to as "best profes-
sional judgment" or "BPJ" limits. EPA has interpreted its BPJ authority in the follow-
ing manner: "Effluent limitations may be established on a case-by-case basis under sec-
tion 402(a)(1) of the Clean Water Act in the absence of applicable effluent limitations
guidelines, or in addition to effluent limitations guidelines if these guidelines do not con-
trol pollutants of concern or particular wastestreams at a facility." 49 Fed. Reg. 38,025
(1984).
60. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 122 app. D, Table 1 (1986); see also Clean Water Act § 306(b),
33 U.S.C. § 1316(b) (1982). EPA originally categorized industry as part of the 1976 Flan-
nery decree. See supra note 49.
There are two additional distinctions made by EPA in setting effluent limitation
guidelines for pollutant dischargers. First, EPA distinguishes between existing sources
and new sources. Compare Clean Water Act § 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1982) (timeta-
ble for achievement of limitations on existing sources) with id. § 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316
(new source standards of performance). The limitations applicable to new sources are
more stringent, on the presumption that the costs of building pollution control technol-
ogy into a new facility are cheaper then retrofitting existing plants.
Second, the effluent limitations developed for existing point sources are imposed in
two phases-"best practicable control technology" (BPT) and "best available control
technology" (BAT)-with the latter phase presumably more restrictive.
61. See, e.g., INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY Div., OFFICE OF WATER REGULATIONS AND STAN-
DARDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, DEVELOPMENT DOCUMENT FOR EFFLUENT LIMITA-
TIONS GUIDELINES AND STANDARDS FOR THE PESTICIDE POINT SOURCE CATEGORY (1985);
EFFLUENT GUIDELINES Div., OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, DEVELOP-
MENT DOCUMENT FOR EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS GUIDELINES AND STANDARDS FOR THE PULP,
PAPER, AND PAPERBOARD AND THE BUILDERS' PAPER AND BOARD MILLS POINT SOURCE CAT-
EGORIES (1982); EFFLUENT GUIDELINES Div., OFFICE OF WATER AND WASTE MANAGEMENT,
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, DEVELOPMENT DOCUMENT FOR EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS
GUIDELINES AND STANDARDS FOR THE TIMBER PRODUCTS POINT SOURCE CATEGORY (1981).
Under paragraph eight of the Flannery decree, see supra note 49, EPA may exclude
specific toxic pollutants from effluent limitations and guidelines on one of three grounds:
(1) equal or more stringent protection is already provided by existing controls; (2) except
for pretreatment standards, the pollutant is present in an effluent discharge solely as a
result of its presence in intake taken from the same body of water into which it is dis-
charged; or (3) the pollutant is present only in trace amounts and is not likely to cause
toxic effects. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 6 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L.
INST.) 20,588, 20,591 (D.D.C. 1976). Because EPA uses this process to exclude from the
effluent limitation guideline process pollutants that do not occur frequently enough on a
national basis, the omission of guidelines for a given pollutant in the wastestreams of
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industrial category, EPA reviews the various control technolo-
gies and the costs of implementing them. Based on this inquiry,
EPA establishes the effluent limitation guidelines specifying pol-
lutant discharge limits that must be included in the NPDES
permits issued to dischargers within each category.
In setting these guidelines, EPA does not consider the envi-
ronmental effects of various levels of pollutant discharges. These
guidelines are based on the feasibility of control and not the en-
vironmental benefits of control. Where zero discharge of a pollu-
tant is technologically and economically feasible, the Act directs
EPA to require zero discharge.62
The technology-based effluent limitations prescribed by EPA's
guidelines are not enforceable until they are incorporated into
an NPDES permit," which is limited to a maximum term of five
years. 64 Once incorporated, these limits are enforceable against
the permit holder even if no demonstrable environmental effects
result from permit violations.
The statute retains water quality standards and water quality-
based permits as additional control mechanisms to protect the
environment from adverse effects. These controls operate where
EPA determines that zero discharge is not immediately attain-
able or technology-based controls are inadequate. 6 Water qual-
ity standards also serve as benchmarks to assess the progress of
the NPDES process in eliminating pollutant discharges into the
nation's waters.66
Permit writers base NPDES permit effluent limitations on
firms within a given industrial category does not preclude the development of site-spe-
cific, technology-based permit limits pursuant to Clean Water Act § 402(a), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(a) (1982).
62. See Clean Water Act § 301(b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (1982) (requiring
compliance with effluent limitation guidelines that "shall require the elimination of dis-
charges of all pollutants if the Administrator finds, on the basis of information available
to him .. . , that such elimination is technologically and economically achievable for a
category or class of point sources"); id. § 304(b)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(3) (In developing
effluent limitation guidelines, EPA must "identify control measures and practices availa-
ble to eliminate the discharge of pollutants from categories and classes of point sources,
taking into account the cost of achieving such elimination of the discharge of
pollutants.").
63. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 130-32 (1977).
64. Clean Water Act § 402(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(B) (1982). This require-
ment is applicable to permits issued by both state and federal authorities. Id.
§ 402(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(3).
65. See id. § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (establishing more stringent
compliance requirement for water quality-based effluent limitations than technology-
based limits when necessary to meet water quality standards); supra notes 7-8 and ac-
companying text.
66. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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three different inquiries: (1) the technological and economic fea-
sibility of controlling the discharge of particular pollutants;6 7 (2)
the predicted effects of a particular pollutant on the aquatic en-
vironment, including humans consuming contaminated fish;68
and (3) the toxicity of particular pollutants as determined
through laboratory studies.6 9 NPDES permits may contain a
myriad of special conditions including requirements that dis-
chargers monitor their effluents, study the environmental effects
of their discharges, and construct pollution control facilities.
The Act requires that NPDES permits include any effluent
limitations necessary to protect water quality even if more re-
strictive than those required by the EPA technology-based efflu-
ent limitation guidelines. 70 As a first step in determining the ap-
propriate water quality-based limitation, states must set water
quality standards for all of their lakes and streams. 71 The states
develop water quality standards in two stages. First, the state
designates for each of its water bodies the current beneficial
uses, such as recreation, fishing, and municipal water supply.
But, consistent with the Act's basic prohibition of pollutant dis-
charges, such uses may not include the disposal of wastes.7 1 Sec-
ond, the state specifies the acceptable ambient concentrations of
various pollutants-"acceptable" in the sense that the level of
pollution will not interfere with the designated uses of the par-
ticular lake or stream. 3
To assist the states in promulgating water quality standards,
EPA must develop "water quality criteria documents" that sum-
marize the relevant scientific literature on the effects of water
pollution on human health and the environment, and the con-
centration and dispersal, or fate, of pollutants in aquatic envi-
ronments. 74 EPA has published water quality criteria documents
for conventional pollutants and for all toxic pollutants given pri-
ority status under a 1976 consent decree. 75 In addition to these
67. See Clean Water Act § 301(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2).
68. See id. §§ 301(b)(1)(C), 304(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1314(a)(1).
69. See id. § 307(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a); see also Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
70. Clean Water Act § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (1982).
71. Id. § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313.
72. 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(a) (1986).
73. Id. § 1 31.6(a), (c); see also id. § 131.3(b).
74. Clean Water Act § 304(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1982).
75. See supra note 49. The criteria for 64 of the 65 priority toxic pollutants were
published in 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 79,318 (1980). The criteria for the 65th-2,3,7,8-Te-
trachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin-were published in February 1984. 49 Fed. Reg. 5831 (1984).
The criteria for ammonia, arsenic, cadmium, chlorine, chromium, copper, cyanide, lead,
and mercury have been revised. 50 Fed. Reg. 30,784 (1985).
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documents, EPA has promulgated regulations establishing the
minimum requirements for state water quality standards."
Each state must submit its water quality standards to EPA
for review. If a state refuses to do so or if the standards do not
satisfy EPA's regulations, the Act authorizes EPA to disapprove
them and to promulgate federal water quality standards for the
state."
In developing NPDES permit effluent limitations, the permit
writer calculates the permissible loadings of each pollutant from
each discharger on the particular water body segment. 78 If the
resulting effluent limit is more restrictive than the applicable
EPA effluent limit guideline, the water quality-based limit must
be included in the permit.
In this fashion, water quality standards remain benchmarks
for measuring progress towards the ultimate "zero discharge"
goal of the Act. In addition, they serve as the basis for requiring
permit limits more stringent than those required by EPA efflu-
ent limitation guidelines. When appraisals of water quality as
regulated by technology-based effluent limitations change, water
quality-based limits become especially significant. As explained
in Part II, only a vital zero discharge goal will preserve high
quality waters under the complementary technology-based and
water quality-based schemes for pollutant discharge control
under the Clean Water Act.
76. 40 C.F.R. pt. 131 (1986). Of particular importance are the requirements that (1)
states review their standards every three years and make needed improvements, id.
§ 131.20; (2) states submit revisions of standards to EPA for its review and concurrence,
id. § 131.21; (3) states develop numerical criteria for toxic pollutants, id. § 131.11; and
(4) states develop an "antidegradation policy" to protect water quality that is higher
than that required by water quality standards, id. § 131.12.
77. Clean Water Act § 303(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (1982). The Seventh Circuit has
held that EPA must deem a state's failure over a long period of time to submit any
standards (in this case, for total maximum daily loads under id. § 303(d), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(d)) to be a decision by the state that none are needed. EPA must review this
constructive finding according to the criteria set forth in the Act and the applicable regu-
lations. Scott v. City of Hammond, Ind., 741 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1984).
78. Permissible loadings are normally expressed in terms of "total maximum daily
loads" or "TMDLs." Clean Water Act § 303(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1982). TMDLs must
be calculated for a lake or stream segment where technology-based effluent limitations
are not stringent enough to "implement" any applicable water quality standard. Id.
§ 303(d)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A). Where there is more than one source of a
pollutant, the permit writer must allocate the TMDL among them. This process is
known as "wasteload allocation."
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II. PRESERVING "HIGH QUALITY" WATERS: EPA's
"ANTIBACKSLIDING" AND "ANTIDEGRADATION" REGULATIONS
As a welcome result of the Clean Water Act's enactment and
implementation, more of the nation's lakes and rivers now meet
the 1983 interim goal of "fishable-swimmable" waters. 9 As
water quality continues to improve and even exceed this goal at
many locations, EPA and state water pollution control agencies
face increased pressure from dischargers to relax water pollution
control requirements. Dischargers and their supporters argue, in
effect, that water quality above present ambient standards is too
clean, and requiring treatment beyond that necessary to reach
and maintain these standards is "treatment for treatment's
sake."80 This argument has found support within EPA,8' and the
Agency has experimented with more "efficient" permit issuance
techniques.82
The pressures to relax pollution controls are most evident in
the development and implementation of two EPA regulations:
the "antibacksliding" and "antidegradation" rules. To date,
EPA's implementation of these rules has been equivocal and, at
times, inconsistent with the zero discharge goal. Properly under-
stood, the zero discharge goal provides EPA with the rational-
izing principle for full implementation of these rules and the
maintenance of high quality waters.
79. See OFFICE OF WATER REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: 1984 REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (1985).
80. See, e.g., Clean Water Act Amendments of 1982: Hearings on S. 777 and S. 2652
Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Environ-
ment and Public Works, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982) (statement of Frederic Eidsness,
Assistant Administrator for Water, EPA) (describing pollution controls beyond those
necessary to meet ambient water quality standards as "treatment for treatment's sake").
See generally Utility Water Act Group, The Clean Water Act: A Regulatory Agenda
(July 13, 1981) (unpublished report submitted to EPA) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L.
REF.).
81. See supra note 80.
82. EPA's Office of Policy, Planning & Evaluation has promoted for several years its
"Water Innovations Project." The purpose of this project is to promote "innovative per-
mitting techniques" that would allow increased discharges of pollutants to make "effi-
cient" use of the assimilative capacity of receiving waters. See, e.g., Downing & Sessions,
Innovative Water Quality-Based Permitting: A Policy Perspective, 57 J. WATER POLLU-
TION CONTROL FED'N 358 (1985); J. Lamb & D. Hull, Current Status in Use of Flexible
Effluent Standards, reprinted in Possible Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources of the House Comm.
on Public Works and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 248 (1985) [hereinafter cited
as FWPCA Amendments Hearings]; Urban Sys. Research & Eng'g, Inc., State Experi-
ence with Water Innovations and Potential for Increased Use (1985) (draft report), re-
printed in FWPCA Amendments Hearings, supra, at 212.
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A. EPA's "Antibacksliding" Regulation
The concept embodied in the zero discharge goal-continued
progress towards eliminating pollutant discharges into national
waters-dictates a dynamic wastewater discharge permit system.
As pollution control technology improves, effluent limitations
become increasingly stringent.
EPA may issue technology-based wastewater discharge per-
mits for terms of no more than five years.8 3 As dischargers seek
reissuance of permits, and wish to minimize pollution control
costs, they continue to raise the question of when, if ever, a reis-
sued permit can contain less stringent controls than the previous
one. Dischargers have argued that changes in facility conditions,
advancements in knowledge about pollution effects, and regula-
tory revisions may warrant relaxing permit limits.8,4 In response
to these arguments, EPA has tried over several years to develop
a regulation specifying the conditions under which NPDES per-
mit limits may be relaxed.
1. The history of EPA's "antibacksliding" rule- EPA's ini-
tial package of regulations for implementing the wastewater dis-
charge permit system made no mention of "backsliding" from
existing permit limits.85 The omission was not so much an over-
sight on EPA's part as it was an indication of the prematurity of
an antibacksliding rule. The focus in the early 1970's was on is-
suing the first round of discharge permits to bring thousands of
dischargers into the Clean Water Act's regulatory ambit.
The seeds of the contemporary antibacksliding debate were
sown when EPA and state water pollution control agencies be-
gan to issue permits under section 402(a)(1) of the Act. The
agencies determined effluent limitations on an ad hoc assess-
ment, according to the permit writer's "best professional judg-
ment" (BPJ), of the treatment capability of individual discharg-
ers."6 When EPA subsequently issued technology-based effluent
limitation guidelines for industrial categories that often required
83. Clean Water Act §§ 402(a)(3), 402(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)(3),
1342(b)(1)(B) (1982).
84. See, e.g., Utility Water Act Group, supra note 80.
85. 40 C.F.R. pt. 125 (1973) (superseded).
86. Congress recognized that EPA would issue permits to individual dischargers
before it issued the effluent limitation guidelines required by § 304 of the Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(b) (1982). Accordingly, the Act provides that "prior to the taking of necessary
implementing actions relating to all such requirements [including the requirement in
§ 301(b) that permits require compliance with effluent limitation guidelines, permits
shall require compliance with] such conditions as the Administrator determines are nec-
essary to carry out the provisions of this chapter." Id. § 402(a)(1), 33 U.S.C.
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less stringent controls than the site-specific limits contained in
initial BPJ permits, dischargers holding such permits began
pressing EPA for relief.
By that time, however, EPA had made an initial attempt to
develop an "antibacksliding" policy. In 1978, as part of a larger
revision of the wastewater discharge permit regulations to reflect
the 1977 FWPCA Amendments, EPA proposed a new rule that
was "necessary to guard against unwarranted 'backsliding' in
pollution control. 8 7 In particular, EPA proposed a general pro-
hibition against relaxing permit limits by requiring that reissued
permits contain effluent limitations at least as stringent as those
contained in the previous permit unless the discharger could sat-
isfy one of three exceptions."8 First, the Agency would relax per-
mit limits if the discharger demonstrated a material and sub-
stantial change in circumstances sufficient to constitute cause
for permit modification under the Act.8" This provision tied ap-
plication of the antibacksliding rule to the permit modification
regulations. These regulations include an exception for relaxing
permit limits where the discharger provides EPA with "new in-
formation" not available when the permit was issued and such
that it "would have justified the application of different permit
conditions at the time of issuance." 90
§ 1342(a)(1). Thus, in the absence of national effluent limitation guidelines, EPA has the
authority to establish permit limitations on a case-by-case or BPJ basis.
The publication of EPA's effluent limitation guidelines did not preempt the permit
writer's authority to issue site-specific, technology-based permit limits. To the contrary,
EPA's General Counsel has ruled that the Agency's decision not to prepare effluent limi-
tation guidelines for particular industries does not deprive permit writers of authority to
issue site-specific permits to individual dischargers within those industries. In re Armco
Steel Corp., Decision of the EPA General Counsel No. 54 (Dec. 22, 1976). Similarly,
EPA's determination of the appropriate limits applicable to a given industry on a na-
tional level through effluent limitation guidelines does not preclude a site-specific deter-
mination by a permit writer that a specific discharger in that industry can and should
exceed national limits.
87. 43 Fed. Reg. 37,078, 37,080 (1978). In support of a prohibition against backslid-
ing, EPA cited United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977). 43 Fed.
Reg. 37,080 (1978). In United States Steel, the Seventh Circuit rejected a discharger's
argument that its permit limits should be relaxed to reflect subsequently-issued, less
stringent § 304(b) effluent limitation guidelines, reasoning that "to authorize an increase
in the pollutants discharged by the plant [would be] a result Congress certainly did not
intend." 556 F.2d at 842; see also Hines, A Decade of Nondegradation Policy in Con-
gress and the Courts: The Erratic Pursuit of Clean Air and Clean Water, 62 IOWA L.
REv. 643 (1977).
88. See 43 Fed. Reg. 37,078, 37,080 (1978).
89. Id.; see 40 C.F.R. § 125.31 (1986) (criteria for modification of NPDES permits).
This exception was made more explicit when EPA revised the antibacksliding rule in
1980. Id. § 122.44(l)(2)(iv); see also infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text; 45 Fed.
Reg. 33,290, 33,341 (1980).
90. 40 C.F.R. § 122.62(a)(2) (1986).
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The other two exceptions applied to the cases in which BPJ
permits issued with ad hoc limits turned out to be more strin-
gent than EPA's effluent limitation guidelines required. In these
instances, EPA would impose less stringent limits if (1) treat-
ment facilities had been installed and properly operated and
maintained, but the discharger had been unable to meet the
more stringent limits,9 1 or (2) the law of a state with an ap-
proved NPDES permit program prohibited permit conditions
more stringent than those required by the applicable effluent
limitation guidelines.2
EPA promulgated this regulation in final form in June 1979,
adding two more exceptions to the general prohibition against
backsliding." In 1980, EPA revised the rule in response to criti-
cism that it was "unduly restrictive." Dischargers argued that
the rule locked them "into maintaining a fixed treatment effi-
ciency even when maintenance of that efficiency level was not
necessary to comply with applicable effluent guidelines." 94 To
avoid such "inefficiencies," EPA added yet another exception to
the antibacksliding provision. This exception allowed relaxation
of permit limits "to correspond to subsequently-promulgated
guideline limitations when increased production significantly
reduces treatment efficiency."9 5
Then, in 1982, EPA proposed to eliminate the antibacksliding
rule altogether where BPJ permit limits proved to be more strin-
gent than subsequently-issued effluent limitation guidelines.96
EPA gave two reasons for abandoning the antibacksliding mea-
91. 43 Fed. Reg. 37,078, 37,080 (1978). Under this exception to the antibacksliding
rule, new, less stringent permit limits had to reflect the level of pollutant control actually
achieved or that level required by the § 304(b) guidelines, whichever was more stringent.
92. Id.
93. See 44 Fed. Reg. 32,854 (1979); 33 C.F.R. § 122.15(i) (1986). EPA responded to
the "concerns of some commenters about the effect of [the antibacksliding rule] where
permits are based on interim final effluent guidelines" by allowing the relaxation of such
limits to reflect subsequently issued, less stringent final guidelines upon a timely request.
44 Fed. Reg. 32,864 (1979).
EPA also decided to allow backsliding where § 402(a)(1) ad hoc permit limits for con-
ventional pollutants were more stringent than those required by a new requirement for
such pollutants set out in the 1977 Amendments. This requirement-"best conventional
technology" (BCT)-sets best practicable technology (BPT) as a floor and best available
technology (BAT) as a ceiling for pollution control, and mandates a cost-benefit analysis
-for deciding the BCT for a particular discharger. Clean Water Act §§ 301(b)(2)(E),
304(b)(4), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2)(E), 1314(b)(4) (1982). Because Congress articulated an
entirely new test for conventional pollutants, EPA reasoned, backsliding from more
stringent ad hoc permit limits to BCT should be allowed to fulfill legislative intent. 44
Fed. Reg. 32,864 (1979).
94. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,341 (1980).
95. Id.; see 40 C.F.R. § 122.62(t)(2)(v) (1981) (superseded).
96. 47 Fed. Reg. 52,072, 52,084 (1982).
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sure as to BPJ permits. First, EPA argued, dischargers should
be given "equal treatment" under the nationally uniform efflu-
ent limitation guidelines, "so that companies who have made
good faith efforts to comply with previously imposed permit lim-
itations will not be penalized nor placed at a disadvantage with
respect to companies operating under subsequently issued, less
stringent limitations. 9 7
EPA's second reason for eliminating the antibacksliding rule
for BPJ permits focused on the efficient use of administrative
resources. The Agency claimed that if dischargers were not al-
lowed to backslide from case-by-case permits when effluent limi-
tation guidelines were later promulgated, they would oppose any
and all site-specific permit limits. The proposed changes would
discourage widespread challenges to permit reissuances, avoiding
the diversion of Agency resources to a variety of legal contests.98
EPA thus proposed to gain the acquiescence of dischargers in
site-specific permit limits with a carrot instead of a stick, by al-
lowing the relaxation of those limits in the future if they turned
out to be more stringent than subsequently-issued limits for the
industry as a whole.
Comments on the 1982 proposed changes were extensive and
pivotal in the development of EPA's antibacksliding policy.," In
its 1984 overhaul of the NPDES permit regulations, EPA reas-
serted its authority to prohibit backsliding and refuse to relax
permit limits, even when subsequently-issued effluent limitation
guidelines were less stringent, as "a logical outgrowth of the
[Clean Water Act's] requirements and goals."100 Most impor-
tantly, EPA abandoned its proposed exception to the antiback-
sliding rule for BPJ permits.101 In doing so, EPA explicitly re-
jected the argument it had advanced two years before-that the
antibacksliding rule created an incentive for dischargers to delay
the BPJ permitting process by challenging their permits in
hopes of benefitting from future, less stringent national effluent
limitation guidelines.1 0 2
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See 49 Fed. Reg. 37,998, 37,019-22 (1984).
100. Id. at 38,019. By EPA's understanding, the Act's "scheme of imposing increas-
ingly stringent pollution control requirements illustrates the Act's national goal of en-
couraging reasonable further progress towards eliminating the discharge of all pollu-
tants." Id.; see United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977); supra
note 87.
101. See 49 Fed. Reg. 37,999, 38,021 (1984).
102.
It would be inconsistent with the goals of the Act for the Agency to [allow back-
sliding] solely because a permittee may try to delay a permit process in hopes of
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Having justified the antibacksliding rule in terms of the goals
of the Clean Water Act, EPA created two new exceptions for
those instances in which "the previous case-by-case limitations
prove to be an incorrect assessment of the discharger's capabili-
ties." 3 The first exception applies if a discharger installed,
maintained, and properly operated treatment facilities necessary
to meet BPJ permit limits, but nonetheless cannot meet the lim-
its. The renewal permit may then contain relaxed limits reflect-
ing either the level of treatment actually attained or the level
required by the national guidelines, whichever is more strin-
gent.10" In effect, this exception allows for the correction of an
initially inaccurate assessment of a discharger's treatment capa-
bilities.10 5 A second exception from the antibacksliding rule is
allowed where the costs of maintaining and operating existing
treatment facilities are "wholly disproportionate to those consid-
ered in a subsequently promulgated effluent guideline."' 0 6
These modifications clarified the application of the antiback-
sliding rule to prevent the relaxation of BPJ permits. In the
same rulemaking, however, EPA added to the confusion sur-
rounding the more difficult issue of applying the rule to permit
limits that are based on ambient water quality standards rather
than technological capabilities. Applying the rule to water qual-
ity-based effluent limits did not become an important issue until
1981, when several sources attacked the Clean Water Act's call
for continued progress toward eliminating pollutant dis-
charges.107 EPA first addressed the issue in the context of pro-
achieving a more favorable result. In addition, the Agency received no specific
data from commenters in support of the allegation that the anti-backsliding pol-
icy created a competitive disadvantage.
Id. at 38,020.
Moreover, EPA recognized that site-specific BPJ limits generally reflected a more ac-
curate assessment of the treatment capabilities of a particular discharger than did the
national guidelines for the discharger's industrial category. Because BPJ limits are calcu-
lated on a case-by-case basis, EPA reasoned, "a BPJ determination can be tailored to the
relevant circumstances and capabilities of the permittee and thereby inherently incorpo-
rates any necessary allowance for variations in individual plants. It would be inconsistent
with that process to replace such limitations with less precisely calculated limitations."
Id. at 38,019.
103. Id. at 38,020.
104. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.44(t)(2)(i), 122.62(a)(17) (1986).
105. This exception to the antibacksliding rule is similar to the "fundamentally dif-
ferent factors" (FDF) variances allowed from the national effluent limitation guidelines.
See id §§ 125.30-.32.
106. 49 Fed. Reg. 38,021 (1984).
107. For example, the Reagan Administration considered a proposal to allow vari-
ances from the nationally uniform, technology-based effluent limitation guidelines where
the discharger demonstrated that increased discharges would not adversely affect water
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moting "innovative" permit issuance techniques to relax the
burdens imposed on the regulated community by the NPDES
program.'08 Several proposals considered in this review involved
relaxing water quality-based effluent limits and had to be recon-
ciled with the zero discharge goal. 109
EPA issued major revisions of the NPDES program regula-
tions in 1984.110 Almost all of EPA's discussion of the antiback-
sliding rule dealt with its application to technology-based efflu-
ent limits where subsequently-issued effluent limitation
guidelines are less stringent than site-specific, technology-based
limits incorporated into a BPJ permit. While reaffirming an-
tibacksliding as fundamental to the attainment of the Clean
Water Act's basic goals, EPA rendered the concept virtually in-
applicable to water quality-based permit limits.
In addressing water quality-based limits, EPA reinterpreted
and expanded the "new information" exception"' to the an-
quality. Responding to a question about EPA's continued commitment to the zero dis-
charge goal at a 1982 Senate hearing, then-Deputy EPA Administrator John Hernandez
explained:
I think what we have said is that if you take the no discharge goal in that kind
of general way of what was America trying to accomplish, and that is to remove
those pollutants that have an impact on stream life, we are going to do that. If
you take it in a more literal sense, then in that narrowest definition of removing
all materials out of water, it is an indefensible argument and one we can't
support.
1982 Senate Hearings, supra note 11, at 10.
108. See supra note 82.
109. For example, using flow-variable, time-variable, or seasonal permit limits would
result in less stringent effluent limits during certain periods. EPA also considered
schemes based on the emissions trading program used in implementing the Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982), under which dischargers could acquire "rights" to
discharge. See supra note 82; 47 Fed. Reg. 15,076 (1982).
At the same time, Congress began to consider reauthorization of the Clean Water Act.
Senator David Durenberger (R.-Minn.), a member of the Subcommittee on Environmen-
tal Pollution of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, proposed an
antibacksliding amendment that applied to both water quality-based and technology-
based permit limits. S. 431, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 14 (1983); see S. REP. No. 233, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7, 26 (1983).
This provoked a flurry of activity within EPA to evaluate and respond to the
Durenberger amendment. The Agency's primary concern was apparently that any an-
tibacksliding language enacted by Congress not preclude the use of "innovative" permit
techniques. Memorandum from Stu Sessions, Director of the Regulatory Policy Division,
Office of Policy Analysis, EPA, to Karen Wardzinski, Office of General Counsel, EPA
(July 20, 1983) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.); Memorandum from Jack M. Camp-
bell, Jr., Acting Associate Administrator for Policy and Resource Management, EPA, to
Rebecca Hanmer, Acting Assistant Administrator for Water, EPA (undated) ("Senate
Committee Anti-Backsliding Amendment") (copy on file with U. MIcH. J.L. REF.). As a
result of EPA lobbying, Senator Durenberger agreed to drop his antibacksliding amend-
ment from the reauthorization bill, which itself was never enacted.
110. 49 Fed. Reg. 37,998 (1984).
111. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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tibacksliding rule. Under this interpretation, the development of
any new method of calculating permit limits based on water
quality may constitute "new information" and therefore qualify
as an exception to the antibacksliding rule.' 12 This new informa-
tion could include the fact that actual water quality in a particu-
lar stream exceeds that required by ambient water quality stan-
dards as a result of dischargers installing pollution control
facilities. Then, EPA can relax permit limits to allow the dis-
charger to use the newly-available assimilative capacity of the
water body.
So understood, the "new information" exception swallows the
antibacksliding rule as applied to water quality-based effluent
limits.113 In practice, water quality that exceeds the interim goal
of "fishable-swimmable" waters will not be maintained even
though it is technologically and economically possible to do so
and the required pollution control equipment or practices are in
place. This interpretation of the antibacksliding rule is thus in-
consistent with the zero discharge goal, EPA's rationale for its
antibacksliding policy, and Congress's intention to eliminate di-
lution in national waters as an acceptable pollution control
solution.
2. Zero discharge and EPA's antibacksliding rule- Devel-
oping water quality-based permit limits is necessarily uncertain
and subjective. It requires reliance upon models of the assimila-
tion of pollutants into rivers and lakes, and upon incomplete
data about actual ambient water conditions and the effects of
pollutants on aquatic life and the environment." 4 Thus, "alter-
112. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.44(l)(2)(iv), 122.62(a)(2) (1986).
EPA explained its new interpretation of this exception in the preamble to the 1984
rulemaking:
EPA would like to clarify one final point on the new information exception to
the anti-backsliding policy in the existing regulations. For purposes of imple-
menting the anti-backsliding provision . . . for a reissued permit, where limita-
tions in the expiring permit were based on water quality standards, "informa-
tion" under § 122.62(a)(2) may include alternative grounds (including necessary
methodology; mathematical parameters, and other assumptions) for translating
water quality standards into water quality-based limitations.
49 Fed. Reg. 38,022 (1984).
113. Moreover, the "new information" exception gives the discharger the incentive of
applying for a reissued permit with less restrictive effluent limits rather than designing
and installing new and improved treatment facilities. The exception encourages the de-
velopment of new models of how pollutants behave in rivers and streams, new methods
for calculating wasteload allocations, and new proposals for permits based on seasonal
considerations, in efforts to get permit limits relaxed. Consequently, resources are di-
verted to such efforts and away from the development of new and improved treatment
facilities.
114. The difficulties of developing and enforcing water quality-based effluent limits
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native grounds . . . for translating water quality standards into
water quality-based limitations"" 5 will always exist. As inter-
preted by EPA, the "new information" exception threatens the
technology-forcing intent of the Clean Water Act and plunges
permit writing into the same morass from which Congress
sought to rescue it in 1972, an endless debate over how much
pollution is "too much."
a. Technology forcing and antibacksliding- The underlying
premise of the Clean Water Act is continued progress towards
eliminating pollutant discharges. Congress mandated in 1972' a
shift in pollution control strategy from the question of how
much pollution is acceptable to the question of how much pollu-
tion control can dischargers afford given the available tech-
nology.
Where water quality-based effluent limits are imposed and a
discharger develops the capability of complying with them, such
limits reflect installed technology capable of continuing and even
improving that level of control.'16 Thus, water quality-based lim-
its become, under these circumstances, the practical equivalent
of site-specific, technology-based controls imposed through BPJ
permits. 117 To the extent they exceed the controls that site-spe-
cific technology assessments would have required when the per-
were the primary reason for the adoption in 1972 of the zero discharge goal and a tech-
nology-based strategy to achieve the goal. See supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text.
115. 49 Fed. Reg. 38,022 (1984).
116. This, of course, assumes the discharger's compliance with the permit limits.
Compliance in turn requires a credible enforcement presence by EPA and state water
pollution control authorities. Whether such a presence exists has been the subject of
much recent debate. See, e.g., Implementation of the Federal Clean Water Act (EPA
Enforcement of the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System Permit Pro-
gram): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House
Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); Comment,
Federal Water Pollution Control Laws: A Critical Lack of Enforcement by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 945 (1983).
117. But see 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(1) (1986) (requiring that NPDES permits include
limits necessary to achieve water quality standards). Dischargers have construed this reg-
ulation to allow water quality-based limits only as necessary to meet water quality stan-
dards. Thus, according to this argument, when knowledge about what is "necessary" to
meet standards changes, the permit writer's authority to impose such limits changes.
See, e.g., Letter from U.G. Stoeffler, Manager, Process Development, Allied Paper, Inc.,
and R. Richard Eaton, Manager, Utilities, Maintenance and Engineering, Allied Paper,
Inc., to Lyell Thomas, Michigan Department of Natural Resources (May 31, 1984) [here-
inafter cited as Stoeffler Letter], reprinted in FWPCA Amendments Hearings, supra
note 82, at 278.
The requirement that permits include limits necessary to achieve ambient water qual-
ity standards may have been the original source of authority for developing water qual-
ity-based effluent limits. This Article argues, however, that this requirement alone
should not govern whether subsequent permits may contain less stringent effluent limits.
Instead, the antibacksliding rule should apply to ensure continued progress towards
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mit was written, water quality-based limits are technology
forcing.'18
Relaxing these limits without requiring a demonstration by
the discharger of technological or economic infeasibility' 9 would
contravene the Act and inhibit reasonable further progress to-
wards eliminating pollutant discharges. Allowing permit limits
to "backslide" would also transform water quality standards
from their intended role as benchmarks of progress into the de-
sideratum of pollution control efforts.
The discharger's countervailing argument is that "reasonable"
progress of a particular discharger towards eliminating pollutant
discharges means progress in concert with its competitors
through uniform application of national effluent limitation
guidelines to all dischargers in a particular industrial category.
Ironically, in a related context, dischargers originally challenged
EPA's uniform application of the effluent limitation guidelines
on the ground that permit writers must consider site-specific
characteristics in translating the guidelines into permit limits. In
upholding EPA's approach, the Supreme Court stated that there
must be some mechanism for considering the capabilities of in-
dividual dischargers to meet the requirements of the guide-
lines. 120 EPA has implemented this directive by allowing vari-
ances from the national guidelines where "factors relating to the
discharger's facilities, equipment, processes or other factors re-
lating to the discharger are fundamentally different from the
factors considered by EPA in development of the national lim-
its."'' Thus, where site-specific, fundamentally different factors
are shown, a discharger may obtain a variance from the technol-
ogy-forcing national effluent limitation guidelines.
In the backsliding context, this reasoning suggests requiring
that the individual discharger continue existing pollution control
measures. Here, the discharger through experience has demon-
strated its technological and economic capabilities to control
eliminating pollutant discharges regardless of any lack of demonstrable environmental
benefits attributable to maintaining the existing level of control.
118. See generally J. BONINE, THE EVOLUTION OF 'TECHNOLOGY FORCING' IN THE
CLEAN Ailk ACT (ENV'T REP. (BNA) Monograph No. 21, 1975); R. STEWART & J. KRIER,
supra note 1, at 371-73 (technology forcing under the Clean Air Act), 515-16 (technology
forcing under the Clean Water Act); La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Envi-
ronmental Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REv. 771 (1977).
119. Because the grounds for permit modifications are tied to the antibacksliding ex-
ceptions, 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(l)(2)(iv) (1986), exceptions to the antibacksliding rule in-
clude technological or economical infeasibility. Id. § 122.62(a)(15)-(16); see 49 Fed. Reg.
38,051 (1984).
120. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 127-28 (1977).
121. 40 C.F.R. § 125.30 (1986).
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pollutant discharges better than the national guidelines would
require. The technology-forcing intent of the Act at the site-spe-
cific level therefore requires that the discharger not be allowed
to backslide from feasible levels of control unless it can demon-
strate technological or economic infeasibility.
b. Refighting old battles- The administrative feasibility of
EPA's approach to applying the antibacksliding rule to water
quality-based effluent limits is as important as the philosophical
integrity of the endeavor. The "new information" loophole un-
dermines the efficient implementation of the Clean Water Act.
Two examples of this approach in action suffice to show the un-
wieldiness of a process that revisits the issue of how much pollu-
tion is acceptable in the reissuance of permits with water qual-
ity-based effluent limits.
In 1984, Allied Paper, Inc. objected to the effluent limits pro-
posed by the Michigan Department of Natural Resources'22 for
inclusion in the renewal NPDES permit for Allied's paper mill
in Kalamazoo, Michigan. Allied argued that recent studies
demonstrated that due to pollution control facilities installed by
the City of Kalamazoo's treatment works and other dischargers,
water quality in the Kalamazoo River exceeded minimum water
quality standards. Allied also argued that models of the river's
current assimilative capacity demonstrated that water quality
standards would not be exceeded if Allied's effluent limits were
relaxed. Allied therefore argued that "new information" existed
to exempt its renewal permit limits from the antibacksliding
rule.12 3
Under EPA's 1984 interpretation of the "new information" ex-
ception to the antibacksliding rule, Allied was correct. The state
permit writers would have to rejustify the existing permit limits
as necessary to ensure the attainment of water quality standards
in light of the improvements to water quality resulting from the
installation of pollution controls by other Kalamazoo River dis-
chargers. Thus, scarce administrative resources would be spent
on updating water quality studies, evaluating Allied's data, and
considering the impact of other discharges, all in order to defend
122. Michigan gained approval under Clean Water Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)
(1982), to implement a state NPDES permit program in 1973. See 50 Fed. Reg. 42,526
(1985).
123. Stoeffler Letter, supra note 117, at 4-5, reprinted in FWPCA Amendments
Hearings, supra note 82, at 281-82. In the alternative, Allied argued that the Michigan
Department of Natural Resources model was "mistaken" and that this also justified re-
laxing Allied's permit limits. The antibacksliding policy, according to Allied, was not
intended to perpetuate in successive permits those mistakes made in earlier permits. Id.
at 6.
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existing permit limits that already reflected Allied's existing
treatment capacity. Moreover, because the available assimilative
capacity claimed by Allied reflected in part the investment in
pollution controls by other dischargers, the permit writer would
have to consider the equities of allowing one discharger to back-
slide and "use up" those water quality improvements.
The practical effect of Allied's argument, a logical extension of
EPA's "new information" antibacksliding exception, is to allow
backsliding whenever water quality can be shown to exceed
water quality standards. Any new model or changed circum-
stances that arguably indicate the existence of water quality bet-
ter than minimum water quality standards would entitle a dis-
charger to relaxed permit limits and the right to pollute "up to"
the standards or the applicable national effluent limitation
guidelines. Thus, Allied and EPA would, as a practical matter,
curtail continued progress in eliminating pollutant discharges
beyond those minimum requirements and return discussions of
water pollution control policy to the arcane, pre-1972 arguments
over how much pollution is "too much."
A second and more intriguing example of the implications of
EPA's interpretation of the antibacksliding rule involves various
proposals to reallocate the assimilative capacity of Wisconsin's
Fox River and to allow the dischargers on the river to trade un-
used allocations. The Fox River, a tributary of Green Bay and
Lake Michigan, receives the effluent of the heaviest concentra-
tion of pulp and paper mills in North America. Historically,
these wastes have contributed to severely degraded water qual-
ity in the Fox River and Green Bay.12" Since passage of the
Clean Water Act, the mills discharging into one stretch of the
Fox River have been subject to strict water quality-based efflu-
ent limits that require control far beyond those required by the
applicable national effluent limitation guidelines.
Recently, one of these mills closed down and ceased discharg-
ing. As a result, water quality in that portion of the Fox River
improved beyond minimum water quality standards. 2 5 The
124. See Bureau of Water Resources Management & Bureau of Fish Management,
Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Resources, Lower Fox River-DePere to Green Bay Water
Quality Standards Review 10-12 (1985) (draft) [hereinafter cited as Water Quality Stan-
dards Review]; WISCONSIN DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S.
FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY-REGION V & UNIVERSITY OF
WISCONSIN-WATER CHEMISTRY DEP'T, FINAL REPORT OF THE Toxic SUBSTANCES TASK
FORCE ON THE LOWER Fox RIVER SYSTEM 1 (1983); J. SULLIVAN & J. DELFINO. A SELECT
INVENTORY OF CHEMICALS USED IN WISCONSIN'S LOWER Fox RIVER BASIN 1-2 (1982).
125. A Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources computer model for dissolved
oxygen conditions in the Fox River predicted the improvement in water quality. It was
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other five dischargers into that segment of the river asked the
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources' 26 to reallocate the
newly-available assimilative capacity of the river and accord-
ingly relax their permit limits even though they were currently
in compliance. The mill's closing down and creation of "unused"
assimilative capacity, they argued, constituted "new informa-
tion" and therefore the antibacksliding rule did not prohibit re-
laxing their permit limits.
Relaxing the mills' permits to "use up" the newly-available as-
similative capacity would have reduced the Fox River's water
quality to minimum standards regardless of the technological or
economic feasibility of requiring the mills to maintain existing
levels of control.'17 Thus, the Wisconsin pulp and paper mills
(and EPA, to the extent its "new information" exception to the
antibacksliding rule supports the mills' reallocation proposal)
would abandon progress towards the goal of eliminating pollu-
tant discharges beyond that required to achieve minimum water
quality standards or required by national effluent limitation
guidelines.'28
c. Equity and eliminating pollutant discharges- Applying
the antibacksliding rule to water quality-based permit limits im-
plicates competing considerations; the Clean Water Act's goal of
continued progress towards eliminating all pollutant discharges
conflicts with dischargers' interest in avoiding water pollution
control requirements that affect any discharger's competitive po-
sition within a given industrial category. 129 The "unfairness" of
not actually measured by water quality sampling. See Water Quality Standards Review,
supra note 125, at 53-56; ENFORCEMENT Div., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, WATER
QUALITY MODEL OF THE LOWER Fox RIVER, WISCONSIN (1973).
126. Wisconsin administers an approved state NPDES permit program under Clean
Water Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1982). Wisconsin's program was approved in
1974. See 50 Fed. Reg. 42,527 (1985).
127. The proposed permit modifications were challenged by the National Wildlife
Federation. Mr. Van Putten represented the Federation in this proceeding. Following a
hearing under state law, EPA Region V vetoed the proposed modifications. EPA based
its veto on asserted violations of its antidegradation policy and its concern for increased
effluent toxicity, and not on the ground that the modifications would violate the an-
tibacksliding rule. Letter from Charles H. Sutfin, Director, Water Division, EPA Region
5, to Lyman F. Wible, Administrator, Division of Environmental Standards, Wisconsin
Department of Natural Resources (July 18, 1985) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REP.).
128. Memorandum from Diane Diks, Water Division, EPA Region V, to Kenneth A.
Fenner, Chief, Water Quality Division, EPA (Jan. 15, 1985) (attachment).
129. This Article does not address the more complicated question of the impact of
pollution control requirements on the competitive position of American industry in the
world market. For an analysis that suggests that these impacts are significant for a lim-
ited number of industries, see the Conservation Foundation's publication, H. LEONARD,
ARE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS DRIVING U.S. INDUSTRY OVERSEAS? (1984).
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imposing site-specific controls upon one discharger that are
more stringent than those imposed uniformly upon its competi-
tors is the obvious challenge to both technology-based and water
quality-based site-specific limits that are stricter than national
effluent limitation guidelines.
Congress clearly sacrificed dischargers' competitive interest in
favor of the environmental interest to the extent that ambient
water quality considerations require controls more stringent
than national effluent limitation guidelines.130 And even when
these considerations no longer justify more restrictive controls,
the zero discharge goal is the supporting rationale for maintain-
ing them. Taking the zero discharge goal as the operative princi-
ple of the Act results in an antibacksliding rule that prohibits
relaxing permit limits, however derived, whenever a discharger
has demonstrated its ability to meet existing limits, including its
compliance with them over time.
This approach, however, does not necessarily dictate an insen-
sitivity to the competitive disadvantages that may result from
imposing more restrictive limits upon some dischargers within a
given industrial category. The solution to such inequities is not
allowing dischargers automatically to backslide from their pre-
sent treatment capabilities but instead increasing the stringency
of the national guidelines. Indeed, the capabilities of some dis-
chargers within a given category to meet more stringent controls
than those prescribed by national guidelines constitute precisely
the kind of evidence EPA is to consider in determining the ap-
propriate level of control to require within an industrial
category. 13 1
Moreover, other exceptions to the antibacksliding rule take se-
rious competitive disadvantages into consideration. A discharger
has the opportunity to demonstrate that the operational and
maintenance costs of its existing control technologies and prac-
tices are significantly greater than the operational and mainte-
nance costs required by the effluent limitation guidelines for its
industrial category. The antibacksliding rule then allows relaxa-
tion of permit limits under the economic infeasibility
exception. 132
130. See supro text accompanying notes 65-78.
131. See Clean Water Act § 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1982); supra notes 43-78 and
accompanying text.
132. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.62(a)(15) (1986). Of course, the rules do not permit relaxa-
tion beyond the level required to meet water quality standards or beyond the level re-
quired by the applicable effluent limitation guidelines. Also, for certain "conventional"
parameters such as suspended solids, the discharger should be required to demonstrate
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B. EPA's Antidegradation Regulation
EPA's antidegradation 'policy is almost twenty years old.133 A
1968 press release issued by the Department of the Interior first
articulated this policy:
Waters whose existing quality is better than the estab-
lished [ambient water quality] standards as of the date
on which such standards become effective will be main-
tained at their existing high quality. These and other wa-
ters of a State will not be lowered in quality unless and
until it has been affirmatively demonstrated to the State
water pollution control agency and the Department of
the Interior that such change is justifiable as a result of
necessary economic and social development and will not
interfere with or become injurious to any assigned uses
made of, or presently possible in such waters. 34
The Department of the Interior mandated that all states de-
velop an antidegradation policy consistent with this statement.
Neither the statutory language nor the legislative history of the
1972 or 1977 Amendments explicitly ratified this policy. Never-
theless, Congress apparently knew of the policy's existence and
implicitly ratified it in the Act's goal to "restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters."13 5
The antidegradation policy differs significantly from the an-
tibacksliding rule. The former is triggered by changes in ambi-
ent water quality whereas the latter is triggered by changes in
permit limits. Thus, the antidegradation policy applies to new as
well as existing pollutant discharge sources, whereas the an-
tibacksliding policy applies only to existing permitted sources.
that relaxing the applicable permit limits will not also result in discharges of toxic sub-
stances at or above levels of concern. This showing is necessary because many toxic sub-
stances adhere to particulate matter during treatment processes. Therefore, increases in
the discharges of particulates may result in increased discharges of toxic substances.
133. The origin of the policy can be traced to a 1966 Department of the Interior
report issued pursuant to the Water Quality Act of 1965. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMIN., GUIDELINES FOR ESTABLISHING WATER
QUALITY STANDARDS FOR INTERSTATE WATERS (1966).
134. Press Release from Secretary of the Interior Udall (Feb. 1968), quoted in Gaba,
Federal Supervision of State Water Quality Standards Under the Clean Water Act, 36
VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1189-90 (1983).
135. Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
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The antidegradation policy also applies to nonpoint sources of
pollutant discharges.1 3
6
Despite the longevity of the antidegradation policy, until re-
cently EPA devoted little attention to its implementation by the
states.137 No federal court has squarely considered either EPA's
authority to develop and enforce the policy or its meaning."'
Thus, although the legality of the antidegradation policy may be
assumed, its scope remains largely undefined.
After some equivocation in proposed rules, EPA in 1983 is-
sued new water quality standards regulations that included a re-
statement of the antidegradation policy."'9 EPA subsequently is-
sued a guidance document providing the states with more
specific information on applying the policy. "1 0
Even with these clarifications, however, EPA still has not re-
solved the most critical issue implicit in the application of the
antidegradation policy-what constitutes "degradation" of water
quality. 4 1 First of all, this question requires a distinction be-
136. The antibacksliding rule has no application to nonpoint sources of pollution be-
cause they are not required to obtain NPDES permits. See id. § 502(12), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(12) (defining "discharge of a pollutant" as "any addition of any pollutant to navi-
gable waters from any point source" (emphasis added)). In contrast, the antidegradation
policy requires "all cost-effective and reasonable best management practices for nonpoint
source control." 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(2) (1986); see also OFFICE OF WATER REGULATIONS
AND STANDARDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, QUESTIONS & ANSWERS ON: AN-
TIDEGRADATION 6 (1985) [hereinafter cited as EPA, ANTIDEGRADATION] ("Nonpoint source
activities are not exempt from the provisions of the antidegradation policy.").
137. For a concise history of the antidegradation policy, see Gaba, supra note 134, at
1188-94.
138. Id. at 1191.
139. The regulations provide:
Where the quality of the waters exceed levels necessary to support propagation
of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and recreation in and on the water, that quality
shall be maintained and protected unless the State finds, after full satisfaction
of the intergovernmental coordination and public participation provisions of the
State's continuing planning process, that allowing lower water quality is neces-
sary to accommodate important economic or social development in the area in
which the waters are located. In allowing such degradation or lower water qual-
ity, the State shall assure water quality adequate to protect existing uses fully.
Further, the State shall assure that there shall be achieved the highest statutory
and regulatory requirements for all new and existing point sources and all cost-
effective and reasonable best management practices for nonpoint source control.
40 C.F.R. § 131.12(2) (1986).
140. EPA, ANTIDEGRADATION, supra note 136.
141. The applicability of the antidegradation policy and the difficulty in developing a
threshold test of "degradation" are issues analogous to the debate over the existence of a
prima facie case of "pollution, impairment, or destruction" or the likelihood thereof to
establish polluter liability under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, MICH.
Comp. LAWS §§ 691.1201-.1207 (1979). See Kimberly Hills Neighborhood Ass'n v. Dion,
114 Mich. App. 495, 320 N.W.2d 668 (1982); Van Putten, The Michigan Environmental
Protection Act, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN MICHIGAN § 4.07 (K. Smith ed. 1982).
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tween protecting existing uses and protecting existing water
quality.'4 2 EPA clarified this aspect of the policy in the 1983
rulemaking, in which antidegradation was made explicitly appli-
cable "[w]here the quality of the waters exceed levels necessary
to support propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and recrea-
tion in and on the water."' 4 Even after degradation, water qual-
ity must "protect existing uses fully.""' Thus, the antidegrada-
tion policy limits degradation of existing water quality to the
point that environmental or recreational uses would be signifi-
cantly affected.
But EPA has not clarified the more fundamental issue of
whether "degradation" implies some demonstrable, even signifi-
cant, impact on ambient water quality or whether it simply
means any net increase of a given pollutant. If the antidegrada-
tion policy is interpreted to apply only where some impact on
water quality is apparent, then permit writers become ensnared
in such disputes as whether a predicted five percent decrease in
fish growth, or a predicted decrease in predator foraging success,
is significant. Recently proposed revisions to EPA's water qual-
ity criteria documents that discuss pollutant effects in such
terms suggest that these examples are not purely hypothetical. 45
Thus, using an "impacts" test to trigger application of the an-
tidegradation policy brings permit writers into the uncertainties
and difficulties that Congress sought to evade with the 1972
Amendments. The alternative is to take seriously Congress's re-
jection of the "how much is too much" approach to water pollu-
tion control. Then, the Act's blanket prohibition against any
pollutant discharge by any person' 46 becomes a per se rule that
any discharge of any pollutant into navigable waters causes some
adverse impact on water quality.
Applying this statutory rule to the antidegradation policy, any
increase in pollutant discharges presumptively will have an im-
pact on water quality, and the policy will therefore apply. This
does not necessarily mean, however, that the new or increased
discharges will not be allowed. The antidegradation policy is not
a "no-growth" rule. Rather, it mandates a careful analysis of the
142. See Gaba, supra note 134, at 1192-94.
143. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(2) (1986).
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEV., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDE-
LINES FOR DERIVING NUMERICAL NATIONAL WATER QUALITY CRITERIA FOR THE PROTECTION
OF AQUATIC ORGANISMS AND THEIR USES (1984); Office of Water Regulations and Stan-
dards, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Ambient Water Quality Criteria for Dissolved Ox-
ygen (1984) (draft).
146. Clean Water Act § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1982).
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social and economic importance of the new or increased dis-
charges, and the balancing of these against the predicted water
quality impacts. Thus, the absence of a de minimus impact rule
does not require extraordinary effort to justify insignificant
degradation.
The implications of this interpretation of the antidegradation
rule are threefold. First, because water quality impacts are pre-
sumed to result from an increase in pollutant discharges, propo-
nents of degradation should be required to develop the informa-
tion necessary to predict actual water quality impacts. The
amount and quality of data required in a specific case should be
a function of the importance of the benefitted interest, the avail-
ability of alternatives, and the anticipated consequences of the
degradation.
Second, under the EPA rule, the degradation must be "neces-
sary to accommodate" the benefitted interest. This implies a
consideration of alternatives and whether achievement of the so-
cial and economic benefits is possible without increasing pollu-
tant discharges. For example, water recycling and reuse by the
discharger may obviate the need for increasing pollutant dis-
charges. Or dischargers could offset increases in point source dis-
charges with reductions in discharges by nonpoint sources that
they control. 14 7 Using the antidegradation policy to ensure that
alternatives are adequately evaluated is consistent with the
Clean Water Act's technology-forcing strategy for progress to-
wards zero discharge.
Finally, EPA continues to finesse the basic issue of what "im-
portant social or economic interests" may be benefitted and
therefore justify degrading water quality. The only guidance
that EPA has ever given on this point asserts:
This phrase is simply intended to convey a general con-
cept regarding what level of social and economic develop-
ment could be used to justify a change in high quality
147. This kind of inquiry would be particularly important where the discharger is a
municipal wastewater treatment plant. In many cases, reductions in urban runoff may
achieve significant pollutant control. Also, EPA has taken the position that increased
treatment costs to a municipality cannot suffice to satisfy the "benefitted interests" test.
Letter from Charles H. Sutfin, Director, Water Division, EPA Region 5, to Lyman Wible,
Administrator, Division of Environmental Standards, Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources (Sept. 6, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Sutfin Letter] (copy on file with U. MICH.
J.L. REF.). Because municipalities are required by § 307(b) of the Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1317(b) (1982), to develop pretreatment programs that require reductions in pollutant
discharges by industrial dischargers into municipal sewer systems as necessary to meet
permit limits, the "benefitted interests" test must also be applied to the industrial dis-
chargers using the particular municipal sewer system. Sutfin Letter, supra.
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waters. Any more exact meaning will evolve through
case-by-case application under the State's continuing
planning process. Although EPA has issued suggestions
on what might be considered in determining economic or
social impacts, the Agency has no predetermined level of
activity that is defined as "important.91
48
EPA obviously intends "importance" to be a relative concept.
How it is defined in any given application should be a function
of the availability of alternatives and, also, the "significance" of
the predicted degradation. Thus, a benefitted interest would
have to be more important to justify degradation projected to
have a significant increase in fish mortality than it would to jus-
tify a five percent decrease in fish growth. Merely showing lower
costs to the discharger is insufficient to constitute an "impor-
tant" social or economic interest. The "important economic or
social development" must be in the "area in which the waters
are located, '" 1 9 suggesting that the benefits of the discharge to
the larger community must be assessed.
The antidegradation policy plays an important role in imple-
menting the Act's goal of continued progress towards eliminat-
ing pollutant discharges. In no case may water quality be de-
graded without adequate justification in countervailing societal
and economic interests that outweigh the degradation. In this
sense, the policy values water quality where the market has
failed to do so and allows only "efficient" degradation so as not
to waste a limited resource. It does so by creating a presumption
of adverse water quality impacts by increased pollutant dis-
charges. The presumption triggers a flexible, site-specific consid-
eration of the economic justifications and social need for water
quality degradation in light of available alternatives and the sig-
nificance of the predicted degradation.
CONCLUSION
This Article argues that the "zero discharge" goal of the Clean
Water Act has continued vitality in directing the Act's imple-
mentation. Specifically, it provides EPA with guidance in main-
taining pollution controls now deemed to be more restrictive
than necessary to achieve minimum water quality standards,
148. EPA, ANTIDEGRADATION, supra note 136, at 8.
149. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(2) (1986).
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and in preserving water quality that exceeds these standards
from the impacts of new or incfeased pollutant discharges. The
Act's "zero discharge" goal provides both the philosophical (and
legal) underpinnings for solutions to these issues and the critical
features of these solutions.
.Recently, Congress recognized the importance of these two is-
sues in adopting comprehensive amendments to the Clean Water
Act.1 50 Section 404 of the bill approved unanimously by both
houses of Congress in 1986 prohibited backsliding from existing
permit limitations, regardless of whether the original limits were
based on technological or water quality considerations.15' It also
explicitly limited EPA's ability to use the "new information" ex-
ception to circumvent the application of the antibacksliding rule
to water quality-based permit limits. 52 Finally, for the first time
in the history of the Act, this section explicitly acknowledged
and ratified the "antidegradation" rule. 53 The conference report
made clear that by the reference to the antidegradation rule,
Congress meant to ratify the rule in effect as of the date of en-
actment of the 1986 amendments. 54
President Reagan pocket-vetoed this bill on November 6,
1986. '5 As this Article goes to press, congressional leaders have
indicated their intention to introduce and pass the same legisla-
tion word-for-word in the 100th Congress, when there will be an
opportunity to override a presidential veto. 5 6
This legislation, if it eventually becomes law, would reaffirm
Congress's commitment to the "zero discharge" goal of the Act.
It would also clearly establish EPA's mandate to seek continued
progress towards eliminating pollutant discharges by adopting
and enforcing stringent antibacksliding and antidegradation
150. S. 1128, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
151. Id. § 404(a) (creates new § 402(o)(1) of the Clean Water Act).
152. See id. (new § 402(o)(2)(B) of the Clean Water Act).
The conference substitute also provides that neither the new information excep-
tion-for both BPJ and water quality based permits-... allows permits to be
adjusted to require less stringent effluent limitations with respect to any revised
waste load allocation or any alternative grounds for translating water quality
standards into effluent limitations, except in one narrow circumstance.
Conference Committee mark-up draft report on S. 1128, at 131-32 (copy on file with U.
MICH. J.L. REF.).
153. S. 1128, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 404(b) (1986) (new § 303(d)(4)(B) of the Clean
Water Act).
154. Conference Committee mark-up draft report on S. 1128, at 1 (discussing the
antibacksliding provisions in the Senate bill) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.).
155. Memorandum Withholding Approval of S. 1128, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1541 (Nov. 10, 1986).
156. 17 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1163 (Nov. 14, 1986) ("Current Developments").
[VOL. 19:4
SUMMER 19861 Clean Water Act 901
rules. Without a renewed commitment by both the Congress and
EPA to this policy, the nation's commitment to cleaning up its
lakes and rivers is likely to falter once minimally acceptable
water quality conditions are achieved. From that point forward,
water pollution control programs will be stymied by a return to
the pre-1972 debate over how much pollution is too much.

